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Considerations for the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce

Preparing to Operate Amidst Private Security Contractors

Molly Dunigan

Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited



NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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Preface

In January 2009, the Pentagon issued U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1404.10, establishing the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW). The CEW is a pre-identified subset of the DoD civilian workforce that is organized, trained, and equipped to deploy in support of combat operations, contingencies, emergency operations, humanitarian missions, disaster relief, restoration of order, drug interdiction, and DoD stability operations.

Meanwhile, deployments of another type of civilian—private military and security contractors—have reached unprecedented levels in recent years. This paper examines survey data collected during a prior RAND study (the results of which were published in *Hired Guns: Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom*). It derives lessons for how the CEW should be trained and prepared to work in theaters where private security contractors (PSCs) are deployed. The paper is meant to help CEW leaders and personnel understand the challenges of interacting with PSCs and how they might play a role in helping the military coordinate with PSCs. In addition, RAND's data on how the U.S. military and U.S. Department of State view PSCs might usefully inform how CEW personnel approach their jobs in theaters where PSCs operate.

This paper should be of interest to CEW planners, CEW personnel, and policymakers working in the areas of counterinsurgency, interagency coordination, and civil-military relations. Readers may also find the following RAND publications to be of interest:

- *Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations*, by Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, James E. Barnett, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Terrence K. Kelly, and Zachary Haldeman, MG-801-A, 2009
- *Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Personnel Capabilities*, by Terrence K. Kelly, Ellen E. Tunstall, Thomas S. Szayna, and Deanna Weber Prine, MG-580-RC, 2008
- *Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency*, by David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Michelle Parker, and Kimberly Colloton, MG-870-OSD, 2009.

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Abbreviations

CBV	Capability-Based Volunteer
CEW	Civilian Expeditionary Workforce
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DoDD	U.S. Department of Defense Directive
DoS	U.S. Department of State
EE	Emergency Essential
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IT	information technology
NCE	Noncombat Essential
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PMC	private military contractor
PRT	provincial reconstruction team
PSC	private security contractor
RC	regional command
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

Considerations for the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce: Preparing to Operate Amidst Private Security Contractors

In January 2009, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive (DoDD) 1404.10, *DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce*, established the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) as a subset of the DoD civilian workforce to be “organized, trained, cleared, equipped, and ready to deploy in support of combat operations by the military; contingencies; emergency operations; humanitarian missions; disaster relief; restoration of order; drug interdiction; and stability operations of the Department of Defense in accordance with DoDD 3000.05” (DoDD 1404.10, 2009, para. 1a).¹ This paper focuses primarily on CEW involvement in counterinsurgency and stability operations, including Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

The CEW is projected to grow to a total of 20,000 to 30,000 employees and—as envisioned in DoDD 1404.10—to include four categories of personnel: Emergency Essential (EE) personnel, Noncombat Essential (NCE) personnel, Capability-Based Volunteers (CBVs), and the CBV Former Employee Volunteer Corps (former DoD employees who are prepared to support backfill or deployed requirements). As of October 2010, the CEW had filled approximately 500 positions, all with volunteers serving for 12-month rotations (interview with Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy official, 2010; DoDD 1404.10, 2009).

This paper examines survey data collected during a prior RAND study, the results of which were published in *Hired Guns: Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Cotton et al., 2010). Its purpose is to derive lessons for how the CEW should be trained and prepared to work in theaters where private security contractors (PSCs) are deployed. The paper is meant to serve as educational material aimed at CEW leaders and CEW personnel to help them understand the challenges of interacting with PSCs and how they might play a role in helping the military coordinate with PSCs. RAND has also collected a variety of data on how the military and U.S. Department of State (DoS) view PSCs, and these data might usefully inform how CEW personnel approach their jobs in theaters where PSCs operate. It is, however, important to make clear at the outset that the experiences of PSCs are not directly applicable to the CEW. Moreover, this paper is not aimed at altering the CEW but, rather, at informing how its personnel are trained to operate in environments that include PSCs.

This paper begins by discussing the CEW in greater detail, providing details on CEW positions and the evolution of the CEW concept. The following section provides a short overview of the extent to which PSCs have been employed in U.S. contingency operations in recent

¹ DoDD 3000.05 has since been reissued as DoD Instruction 3000.05, which outlines DoD policy with regard to the department’s role in stability operations.

years and the tasks that they perform during these operations. It then summarizes and assesses data from the *Hired Guns* study, including military and DoS responses to survey questions regarding how well PSCs coordinated with both military and DoS personnel in theater in OIF between 2003 and 2008, as well as their views on whether PSCs interfered with their ability to do their jobs effectively and the extent to which each group received predeployment training regarding PSCs. In referencing these data, my argument is twofold: (1) the CEW should receive predeployment training on the benefits of coordinating with PSCs in theater, in both structured and ad hoc ways, and, (2) if properly trained, the CEW can assist in PSC-military coordination by liaising between PSCs and the military when in a position to do so. The concluding section of this paper lays out the conditions under which the CEW might be able to assist in PSC-military coordination and outlines the main points that should be covered in any CEW training session regarding PSCs.

The U.S. Department of Defense Civilian Expeditionary Workforce

Due to its size, the CEW—when it is fully staffed—will be positioned to provide a large proportion of deployable U.S. government civilian capacity. As of October 2010, the CEW had filled approximately 500 positions, all with volunteers serving for 12-month terms (interview with Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy official, September 2010). CEW personnel are hired to serve as

- contracting staff (to respond to requests for proposals for Commander's Emergency Response Program funds in theater)
- security administration staff
- public affairs staff conducting media relations and developing communication strategies for deployed U.S. forces
- foreign affairs staff²
- general attorneys
- transportation specialists performing vehicle maintenance

² Because “foreign affairs staff” positions have historically been reserved for DoS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel, the CEW’s mention of these roles as some of its core tasks speaks to the merging of functions across agencies, particularly in an era in which DoD is much better resourced than DoS (Stanger, 2009). However, as described in the employment section of the CEW website, as of this writing (in December 2011), CEW foreign affairs staff differ from traditional DoS and USAID foreign affairs staff in that they have a fairly limited mandate to assist with reconstruction and development policy. For instance, one of the four fairly similar position descriptions for foreign affairs staff in December 2011 was as follows:

Provides in-depth subject matter expertise on reconstruction and development policy issues and coordinates requirements of IJC [International Security Assistance Force Joint Command] Staff with the Regional Command [RC] on this issue. Proposes inputs on development issues to get overall operational coherence across the RC and its PRTs [provincial reconstruction teams]. Builds and maintains positive relations with the military and civilian elements within the Regional Command and its PRTs. Provides analytical input and knowledge on regional reconstructions and development issues to [the Deputy Chief of Staff for Stability Operations]/IJC. Provides routine and ad hoc briefings as tasked. Maintains a current overview of the stability situation in the [area of responsibility]. Supports coordination, planning, and organizing PRT conferences. Manages, prepares and tracks routine and ad hoc reports, returns and presentations for the branch. Provides critical evaluation of regional, provincial and district development plans. Conducts visits, follow up reporting and action, shares [lessons learned] and best practices. Prepares recommendations for changes to policy, procedures or laws to improve sub-national development performance. (DoD CEW, undated)

- information technology (IT) managers
- language specialists serving as translators and cultural advisers to U.S. officers
- intelligence specialists providing technical and IT support to intelligence personnel on U.S. bases in theater
- human resources assistance staff
- “AfPak Hands” performing development and government capacity-building work in Afghanistan³
- civil engineers working with host-nation and U.S. contractors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on civil-military operations projects (DoD CEW, undated).

At this nascent stage in the organization’s development, CEW personnel are primarily drawn from DoD, but the CEW can, in theory, also include personnel drawn from other U.S. government agencies. The CEW has a database of more than 17,000 résumés from which to draw and currently hires personnel as federal civilian employees with a 12-month appointment. These employees can be brought in on a temporary basis without competition and span a wide range of education, experience, and wage levels. While DoD hires contractors to fulfill other roles, the CEW does not hire personnel on a contract basis (interview with Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy official, September 2010).

The CEW concept is evolving, however. More recently, the DoD has been coordinating an instruction that will transition the CEW away from volunteers and into a more steady-state, traditional program. The revised program is envisioned to be grounded in position requirements identified by the services. Positions will be designated as EE, which can include rotations for combat or noncombat operations, or as NCE. The position incumbents will have some rights and opportunities to accept or not accept their position designation. For new hires, rotations will be a condition of employment. The need to identify volunteers from within DoD or new hires for contingency or other operations where the components (i.e., the military services and DoD community) cannot supply resources may remain. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy recently established an international program office, which will include a CEW director. The office has also been coordinating with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the

³ AfPak Hands is a relatively recent, “all-in” language and cultural immersion initiative developed in 2009 under Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mike Mullen to help the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) accelerate the continual transition of more responsibility to Afghanistan’s government and security forces (Chlosta, 2010). These positions require a more extensive commitment than other CEW positions and are described on the CEW website as of December 2011 as follows:

AFFPAK Hands is a special emphasis, high priority Department of Defense program designed to improve effectiveness and provide continuity to the contingency effort in Afghanistan. Each of the following positions will require extensive commitment from candidates selected. Standard assignment will begin with 10 days of combat skills/pre-deployment training at Camp Atterbury, IN and 16 weeks of language training in Washington, DC, followed by an initial 12 month assignment in Afghanistan. Deployers will then return for approximately a 12 month out-of-theater assignment (related to their theater duties), followed by refresher combat skills training, 16 weeks of advanced language training, and a second assignment in Afghanistan. All positions will involve considerable cultural immersion and frequent contact with Afghan officials. (DoD CEW, undated)

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness with regard to orientation and mobilization training (interview with DoD official, 2011).⁴

Table 1 illustrates that there is virtually no overlap in the roles performed by CEW and PSC personnel, though there is some potential for overlap between the CEW and the larger category of private military contractors (PMCs), who perform logistical and base support and maintenance functions. Despite this lack of direct overlap in the functions they perform, the CEW has a high likelihood of operating in a theater in which PSCs are deployed, particularly if PSCs are employed in future contingencies to the extent that they were employed in OIF. The chance that CEW personnel will encounter PSCs in theater speaks to a need for CEW awareness of PSC operations. The next section provides a brief overview of the extent to which PSCs have been and continue to be used in recent and ongoing U.S. contingency operations, and the subsequent section details several lessons from the *Hired Guns* survey data that could be relevant to future CEW operations.

Table 1
A Comparison of the Functions of CEW and Contractor Personnel

Roles of PSC and PMC Personnel	Roles of CEW personnel
PSCs: Security	Security administration
Static site security	Contracting
Convoy security	Public affairs
Personal security details	Foreign affairs
PMCs: Logistical support	General attorney
Weapon support and upkeep	Transportation specialists
Communication system maintenance	Logistics management
Supply transport	Human resources assistance
Reconstruction workers	IT management
Language specialists/translators	Language specialists
Intelligence	Intelligence
Interrogators	Financial administration
PMCs: Base operations support	AfPak Hands
Engineers, builders	Civil engineers
Cooking, cleaning	

NOTE: Shading indicates potentially overlapping positions.

⁴ Changes afoot at the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy indicate that the CEW concept may eventually be replaced by a more broad-based concept of “deployed DoD civilians.” However, this change is irrelevant to the overall conclusions of this paper. Indeed, the conclusions and recommendations outlined here are relevant to deployable DoD civilians regardless of whether they fall under the CEW structure or not. For the sake of simplicity, and because the CEW is still in existence, the remainder of the paper refers to these deployable DoD civilians as CEW personnel.

Private Security Contractors in U.S. Operations

Deployments of another type of civilian, armed PSCs, have reached unprecedented levels in U.S. contingency operations in recent years, at least as far as modern U.S. history is concerned. Indeed, the number of armed PSCs employed by *all entities* in OIF grew from approximately 10,000 in 2003 to approximately 30,000 in 2007 (Traynor, 2003; Miller, 2007). Meanwhile, U.S. government reports indicate that there were more than 16,000 armed PSCs in Afghanistan employed by DoD alone by the second quarter of 2010 (U.S. Senate, 2010, p. 81). These personnel were hired to perform a variety of security-related tasks, notably static site security, mobile convoy security, and personal security details (i.e., bodyguarding).

PSCs encompass a variety of nationalities, including citizens of the United States and other coalition countries, local national citizens of the countries in which they operate, and third-country nationals, citizens of countries other than the country hiring them and the country in which they operate. For instance, a number of the third-country nationals performing security duties in Iraq worked for U.S. firms but hailed from Uganda (Raz, 2007). As of March 2011, of the approximately 90,000 contractors in Afghanistan, 20,000 were U.S. citizens, 24,000 were third-country nationals, and 46,000 were local nationals (Schwartz and Swain, 2011, pp. 10–11). While these numbers encompass all types of contractors—not just security contractors—they are illustrative of the issues that the CEW may confront and should be aware of when operating amidst PSCs in theater.

Those in charge of CEW training should ensure that CEW personnel are aware of the nuances pertaining to different nationalities of PSCs and that they are particularly sensitive to the cultural and security implications of operating around different nationalities of security personnel in countries where cultural nuances can make a discernible difference in the security environment. For instance, local nationals hired by DoD in Afghanistan as of March 2011 made up 51 percent of DoD contractor personnel in that country. Therefore, based on the available data, it appears that DoD uses more local nationals in Afghanistan than U.S. citizens and third-country nationals combined. However, the percentage of contractor personnel who are local nationals has steadily declined from a high of 86 percent in September 2008 to a low of 51 percent in March 2011, despite DoD's "Afghan First" policy of trying to hire local nationals in an attempt to build Afghan state capacity (Schwartz and Swain, 2011, pp. 11–12). According to the Congressional Research Service,

Pursuing an Afghan First policy raises a number of issues. For example, focusing on the nationality of contractor personnel, and not where in Afghanistan workers are from, can undermine some of the goals of the Afghan first policy. When contractors are working in a given region, the local population often wants local residents to be hired to perform the work. In such situations, bringing in Afghan contractors who are not from the local community could undermine efforts to build relationships with the local populace. Another issue to consider is whether in certain circumstances awarding contracts to local nationals could empower bad actors, criminal gangs, or corrupt individuals. In those instances, it may be preferable to award a contract to foreign companies. (Schwartz and Swain, 2011, p. 12)

Perhaps more illustrative of this point, and directly relevant to CEW operations, is the Congressional Research Service's next point:

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has generally had little visibility into who the local national contractors and subcontractors are who work for DoD, including not knowing the extent to which money from government contracts is empowering bad actors or groups whose interests run counter to the mission of coalition partners. (Schwartz and Swain, 2011, p. 12, citing a Joint Staff briefing)

While CEW personnel are unlikely to have any control over this or related problems, they should have knowledge of the potential issues that can arise in theater pertaining to the variety of contractor nationalities, both for their own security and to ensure their effective support of U.S. forces. They should also note that there are many PSCs operating in theater for clients and entities other than the U.S. government, and—due to the potentially divergent aims of these forces and U.S. forces—CEW interactions with these other PSCs might be even more problematic than those with the PSCs employed by the United States.

While PSCs have been found to provide valuable skills and offer necessary services to the U.S. military, they also have the potential to hinder military operations in several ways—one of which is through their occasionally problematic coordination with their military counterparts. Because the CEW, when used in contingency operations, is designed to deploy as part of the military force in a supportive role, the issue of PSC coordination with the military could have an effect on the CEW as well. The following discussion explores this possibility in more detail.

Implications of the *Hired Guns* Data for Future Civilian Expeditionary Workforce Operations

In June 2010, RAND published a report on private security contractors in Iraq titled *Hired Guns: Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Cotton et al., 2010). Drawing on two surveys—one of U.S. military personnel and one of DoS personnel—conducted by RAND between 2006 and 2008, the report aimed to determine the costs and benefits of armed PSCs to the U.S. mission in Iraq and the effects of these contractors on U.S. military operations in this theater.⁵ The report focused on armed PSCs because of their overwhelming prevalence in Iraq during the period in question.

⁵ The *Hired Guns* report notes that the total sample size for the survey of military personnel was $n = 1,070$. After 20 weeks in the field, the researchers collected a total of 249 completed surveys from the military sample (a 23.27-percent response rate). Given that only 23 percent of those invited to participate completed the military version of the survey, the report states that a degree of nonresponse bias cannot be ruled out, and the survey's results cannot necessarily be extrapolated to the entire general population of military personnel deployed during OIF. However, the authors believe that the greater value lies in the opinions of those who worked closely with contractors. Therefore, the survey results that are presented in the report are primarily from that subset of respondents, which was possible because many of the survey responses were coded to show the distinction between respondents who had experience with armed contractors and those who had little or no such experience. This coding was derived from a question on both surveys asking, "During OIF, how often did you interact with armed contractors hired either directly or indirectly by the U.S. government?" Respondents could answer "never," "rarely," "sometimes," or "often." If they answered "never" or "rarely," they were categorized as "no experience," while answers of "sometimes" or "often" were categorized as "experience." However, the report notes that, even when the survey question asked respondents whether they had firsthand knowledge of a particular armed contractor's behavior or impact, those who classified themselves as not having had direct experience interacting with armed contractors could feasibly respond, because direct experience with armed contractors and firsthand knowledge of incidents involving them are not mutually exclusive (Cotton et al., 2010, pp. 3, 5–6).

According to the authors,

The scope of support from armed private security contractors (PSCs) in the Iraq war has been unprecedented. In 2003, approximately 10,000 of these specialized, armed security personnel were providing services in Iraq. By 2004, that number had doubled, and over the next three years, it grew to approximately 30,000. By March 2009, this number had again receded to 10,422. PSCs work for almost every organization in Iraq. The largest clients by far in the security market in Iraq are the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). However, journalists, reconstruction contractors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and even other U.S. government agencies frequently view them as a logical choice to fill their security needs. (Cotton et al., 2010, p. xi)

In that study, the survey data were broken down into six substantive categories. These categories examined, respectively, whether PSCs had a negative effect on military retention and morale, whether PSCs had an adverse effect on local Iraqis' perceptions of the entire occupying force because of the legal impunity with which they operated in that country prior to 2009, whether there was a lack of systematic coordination between PSCs and the military, whether PSCs played a valuable supportive role to the U.S. military as a force multiplier, whether PSCs provided skills and services that the armed forces lacked, and whether PSCs provided vital surge capacity and critical security services. Of interest for CEW planners are the survey findings pertaining to levels of coordination between PSCs and the military, the extent to which PSCs were thought to be interfering with the ability of U.S. military and DoS personnel to perform their jobs effectively, and the level of predeployment training regarding PSCs that each group of respondents received.


It is significant for CEW planners and personnel to note that the majority of military respondents in the *Hired Guns* survey—55 percent of those who had experience interacting with armed contractors—had, to varying degrees, witnessed failures by PSCs to coordinate with military commanders (see Figure 1) (Cotton et al., 2010, p. 39). It is impossible to know from the *Hired Guns* data why such failures occur, and there is a strong possibility that PSC failures to coordinate with military commanders are typical of coordination challenges between a variety of interagency and military actors in a conflict zone. However, such findings should nonetheless serve as a warning to CEW members that there is no reason to assume that PSCs are any more inclined or likely to coordinate their actions with U.S. forces than other U.S. forces and other government agencies are. CEW members and planners should therefore not expect that PSCs will coordinate well with the CEW or military forces and should be prepared to handle situations involving of a failure or lack of coordination on the part of PSCs operating in their area of operation. Such preparation is especially important for CEW members acting as security administrators, who will be expected to coordinate on behalf of the contractors supporting them.

Beyond a failure to coordinate, PSCs can impede military personnel as they perform their duties. This could potentially affect the activities of CEW personnel supporting the military, and CEW planners should be aware of this possibility and prepare their personnel to deal with

The sample population for the DoS survey was $n = 1,727$. After 33 days in the field, the RAND team collected a total of 834 completed surveys (48.29 percent) and 58 partially completed surveys (3.36 percent) with usable data. Thus, 892 DoS participants' responses were included in the final data set (a 51.65-percent response rate).

Figure 1
DoD Survey: Failure to Coordinate

“During your time in the region during OIF, how often did you have firsthand knowledge of armed contractors failing to coordinate with military commanders?”



SOURCE: Cotton et al., 2010, p. 39, Figure 5.1.


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such situations. Figure 2 shows that while a majority of military respondents also had never seen armed contractors getting in the way of active-duty military personnel trying to perform their jobs, 16 percent of those with experience interacting with contractors reported having “sometimes” observed such hindrances of military personnel, and 6 percent of this pool of respondents “often” observed such hindrances (Cotton et al., 2010, pp. 39–40). The *Hired Guns* report notes that these response rates, while fairly low, are nonetheless troubling.

Not only do PSCs fail to coordinate with U.S. military personnel on occasion, but the military has been known to hinder PSC operations as well. Again, this speaks to the possibility that these problems are symptomatic of the larger challenge of wartime coordination between

Figure 2
DoD Survey: Contractors Hindering Military Personnel

“During your service in OIF, how often did you observe armed contractors hindering the operations of active-duty military personnel trying to perform their job?”



SOURCE: Cotton et al., 2010, p. 40, Figure 5.2.

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
a variety of military and interagency actors, rather than a problem endemic only to PSCs. As Figure 3 shows, more than 80 percent of those inexperienced with contractors and half of those who had interacted with them had never observed military personnel impeding the operations of PSCs, but slightly more than 13 percent of respondents with experience interacting with contractors reported having “sometimes” observed military personnel hindering PSC operations.

While the military was not frequently seen to be impeding PSC operations, it is relevant for CEW planners and personnel to note that such incidents have occurred in the past and that it is crucial for the military and PSCs to work together in theater if U.S. operations are to proceed as intended. Moreover, it is important for CEW personnel to note that, because they are DoD civilians deployed alongside U.S. military forces, they may be placed in a position in theater in which they could potentially impede PSC operations. Precautions should be taken to avoid such hindrances, as they can lead to inefficiencies in theater operations.

On the other hand, because they are positioned to support U.S. forces, CEW personnel could also play an important role in preventing the military from impeding contractor operations and vice versa, serving as a sort of civilian “buffer” between the two forces. As noted earlier, those employed as security administrators will be well positioned to fulfill such a role. To this end, CEW personnel must be trained appropriately with regard to the risks and benefits of working alongside PSCs and must be made aware of their potential to assist PSC-military coordination wherever relevant. The specifics of how CEW personnel could avoid hindering PSCs and assist with PSC-military coordination would depend on the specific circumstances of the planned deployment and the context of the conflict in question; thus, it is difficult to detail the ideal content of such training here. Nonetheless, this is a serious issue that CEW planners should take into account when developing the content of CEW training.

The *Hired Guns* report notes that “State Department views reinforced those of the military, generally supporting the notion that the efforts of armed contractors and military per-

Figure 3
DoD Survey: Military Hindering Contractor Personnel




SOURCE: Cotton et al., 2010, p. 40, Figure 5.3.
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sonnel to work together smoothly went both ways" (Cotton et al., 2010, p. 41). This bodes well for CEW personnel, as it indicates that the likelihood that they will witness or encounter PSC personnel hindering their or their military counterparts' jobs is fairly low. Indeed, nearly 60 percent of diplomatic personnel who had experience interacting with PSCs believed that the contractors tried to coordinate well with the military (see Figure 4). Again, however, a troubling minority (16 percent) of DoS respondents experienced in interacting with armed contractors and those who had little or no such experience disagreed with the statement that armed contractors make an effort to work smoothly with U.S. military personnel. These data once again speak to a need for CEW personnel to be prepared to deal with situations in which PSCs and the military do not work smoothly together.

One way that CEW personnel might reasonably be prepared to operate alongside PSCs in theater is through training modules specific to their jobs that include realistic scenarios involving PSCs. However, such training has been largely absent even from military and DoS pre-deployment training packages, indicating the need for improvement in training U.S. government personnel to deal with armed contractors on the ground in theater. Indeed, only 18 percent of military respondents in the *Hired Guns* survey reported that it was "typically true" that "before deployment, active-duty military personnel are given instruction regarding how to work with armed contractors." In contrast, 65 percent reported that such a statement was "typically false."

DoS respondents had similar sentiments, with 25 percent reporting that it was "typically true" that "before assignment to the region, State Department personnel are given instruction regarding how to work with armed contractors." Sixty-five percent of DoS respondents felt that they received no such training, and 9 percent had no opinion on the issue (data set from Cotton et al., 2010).

Figure 4
DoS Survey: Armed Contractors Work Smoothly with Military



SOURCE: Cotton et al., 2010, p. 41, Figure 5.4.

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Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

The findings of the *Hired Guns* report have several implications for how CEW personnel should be prepared to work in contingencies involving PSCs. First, CEW planners and personnel should note that PSC failures to coordinate with military forces in OIF occurred at a rate that was significant enough to warrant the CEW's preparation for situations in which PSC-military coordination does not proceed smoothly. Meanwhile, U.S. military failures to coordinate with PSCs in their area of operation tended to occur only rarely in OIF during this time frame, but again, they were significant enough to be noticeable and could potentially affect U.S. operations. Because the CEW is part of the deployed U.S. force and could therefore play a role in either assisting or hindering the military's coordination with PSCs, CEW planners should consider how to prepare CEW personnel for their exposure to PSCs in theater. As part of this, CEW personnel employed as security administrators cannot assume that PSCs are any more inclined or likely to coordinate their actions with U.S. forces than other U.S. forces and other government agencies are. Ensuring effective coordination will require close and continuous attention.

Aside from these findings, it is important for CEW personnel to understand that PSCs can hail from a variety of different nationalities in relation to the place in which they operate and that they work for different governments and nongovernmental entities in addition to the U.S. government. This point is relevant for CEW awareness of their own security situation while deployed, as well as to their ability to support U.S. forces. In addition, CEW personnel need to understand that cultural sensitivities will likely dictate how PSCs of certain nationalities, as opposed to others, are accepted in a region and might affect the security climate.

CEW preparation for encountering and, at times, operating alongside PSCs in theater could be accomplished through predeployment CEW training modules specific to particular CEW positions and deployment circumstances. Such modules should highlight the potential situations in which CEW personnel might confront PSCs in the field. For instance, CEW personnel working in security administration positions should be prepared for the fact that they may be overseeing PSCs from one or several different firms and that whether these PSCs are local nationals, third-country nationals, or U.S. citizens could have a distinct impact on the security situation in their area of operation.

Finally, CEW personnel serving as civil engineers performing civil-military operations alongside military and NGO personnel should be aware that many NGO and USAID personnel are accompanied by private security teams in theater. CEW personnel in such a situation should help their military counterparts plan to successfully coordinate movements and other aspects of the operation with these PSCs, but they should also be prepared for coordination mishaps. If properly trained, CEW personnel could ultimately be asked to assist in PSC-military coordination by liaising between PSCs and the military if and when they find themselves in a position to do so. At the very least, they will know how to ensure that their own operations do not hinder PSC operations.

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